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Bijkerk, S. H., Dominguez Martinez, S., Kamphorst, J., & Swank, O. H. (2021). Labor Market Quotas when Promotions are Signals. Journal of labor economics, 39(2), 437-460. https://doi.org/10.1086/710358[details]
2019
Czibor, E., & Dominguez Martinez, S. (2019). Never too Late: Gender Quotas in the Final Round of a Multistage Tournament. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 35(2), 319–363. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewz003[details]
Dominguez Martinez, S., Sloof, R., & von Siemens, F. A. (2014). Monitored by your friends, not your foes: strategic ignorance and the delegation of real authority. Games and Economic Behavior, 85, 289-305. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.02.003[details]
Dominguez Martinez, S., & Swank, O. H. (2006). Polarization, Information Collection and Electoral Control. Social Choice and Welfare, 26(3), 527-545. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0105-3
2012
Dominguez-Martinez, S., Sloof, R., & von Siemens, F. (2012). Monitored by your friends, not your foes: Strategic ignorance and the delegation of real authority. Universiteit van Amsterdam/ Tinbergen Institute. [details]
Dominguez-Martinez, S., & Swank, O. H. (2011). On the role of pre-determined rules for HRM policies. (Tinbergen Institute discussion paper; No. 2011-034/1). Tinbergen Institute. http://www.tinbergen.nl/discussionpapers/11034.pdf[details]
Dominguez-Martinez, S., Sloof, R., & von Siemens, F. (2010). Monitoring your friends, not your foes: strategic ignorance and the delegation of real authority. (Tinbergen Institute discussion papers; No. TI 2010-101/1). Tinbergen Institute. [details]
Dominguez Martinez, S., Swank, O. H., & Visser, B. (2006). Disciplining and screening top executives. (Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper; No. TI 2006-054/1). Tinbergen Institute. http://papers.tinbergen.nl/06054.pdf
2004
Dominguez Martinez, S., & Swank, O. H. (2004). Does electoral competition create incentives for political parties to collect information about the pros and cons of alternative policies. (Tinbergen Institute discussion paper; No. 2004-133/1). Amsterdam: Tinbergen Institute.
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