Tolga Caskurlu is an Assistant Professor of Finance in University of Amsterdam Business School. He received B.S. in Computer Engineering and M.S. in Finance both from Bilkent University, Turkey. In 2014, he earned PhD Finance degree from the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign. His current research focuses on the intersection of law and corporate finance including M&A, entrepreneurship and financial intermediation.

CV 

For detailed information:  https://sites.google.com/site/tolgacaskurlu2/

1) Effects of Patent Rights on Acquisitions and Small Firm R&D (Revise & Resubmit, Journal of Financial Economics)

Presented at: FOM Conference (Dartmouth College), SFS Cavalcade (Toronto), EFA (Oslo), CEPR ESSFM  Corporate  Finance  Conference  (Gerzensee),  FIRS  (Iceland),  Searle  Conference  on  Innovation  Economics(Northwestern-Kellogg), Entrepreneurial Finance and Innovation Conference (Brandeis University), CELS (UC Berkeley Law School), WELS Conference (UCLA Law School), Junior Empirical Legal Scholars Workshop (Jerusalem), Tilburg Competition, Standardization, and Innovation Conference (Amsterdam), SGF Conference (Zurich)

I investigate how patent rights affect R&D incentives. For this purpose, I hand-collect detailed data on patent lawsuits in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC). Using historical decisions of randomly assigned judges as an instrument for lawsuit outcomes and a Supreme Court decision as an exogenous variation for patent enforcement, I find that infringers increase acquisitions to obtain substitute patents in a strong enforcement regime. Moreover, they also increase Corporate Venture Capital (CVC) financing and form more joint ventures. The increase in acquisition market liquidity and venture investments lead to innovation and successful outcomes for small firms.

2) An IPO Pitfall: Patent Lawsuits (Revise & Resubmit, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis)

Presented at: 4th SDU Finance Workshop (Odense-Denmark), Munich Summer Institute Conference, University of Amsterdam, and University of Groningen

I document a previously unexplored substantial cost of initial public offerings (IPOs): patent lawsuits. I find that firms become targets of excessive patent lawsuits shortly before IPO completions, and the litigation intensity persists after firms become public. However, firms that withdraw their IPO filings do not experience an increase after the withdrawal date. Unlike an IPO, being acquired leads to a decrease in lawsuits. Overall, these results show that going public makes firms vulnerable to costly litigation. Moreover, the percentage of IPO firms affected by patent lawsuits has been surging in the last two decades.

3) Big (Patent) Short: Hedge Funds and Unannounced Lawsuits (with Huseyin Gulen and Veronika Krepely Pool )

This paper documents evidence that hedge funds (HFs) use private information from their investments to trade on other companies.  Using unique trade level data, we find that HF shareholders of  plaintiffs short-sell defendant stocks before lawsuit announcements.  Moreover, the short-selling occurs only if the defendant experiences sizable negative lawsuit announcement returns. Our results also show that firms that have an increase in hedge fund ownership files more lawsuits.  Overall, the results demonstrate that HFs not only profit from the return of their investments but also from the private information that they gather from these investments.

4) -What Determines the Design of Bank Loan Contracts? A New Channel

I investigate whether uncertainties in bankruptcy procedures shape financial contracting in the U.S. syndicated loan market. Utilizing a novel hand-collected data set, I exploit the application of substantive consolidation procedure in the U.S. bankruptcy courts. This procedure has two unique features that provide an elegant experimental framework. First, it removes seniorities granted in the original contracts, resulting unexpected huge losses on unsecured bank loans. Second, there is consensus among practitioners that its application is unpredictable since there is no specific provision in the U.S. Code. I find that after exposure, lenders transmit this shock to other clients as requiring collateral more often in their new loans. Moreover, if exposed lenders issue new unsecured loans, then they demand higher interest rate and tighter covenants, even controlling for bank capitalization, borrower and time fixed effects. To my knowledge, this is the first paper to show that uncertainties in the bankruptcy procedures provide an important friction in the loan market. Furthermore, this work complements the previous literature by providing a new channel for the determinants of optimal financial contracts. Results of this paper are also important for policy makers, who want to ease bank lending standards. 

Presenter, Munich Summer Institute Conference, 2019.

Presenter, 4th SDU Finance Workshop (Odense-Denmark), 2019.

Discussant, WFA (Coronado, CA), 2018.

Presenter, EFA (Oslo), 2016.

Presenter, FOM (Dartmouth College), 2016.

Presenter, SFS Cavalcade (Toronto, scheduled), 2016

Presenter, Searle Center Conference on Innovation Economics (University of Northwestern-Kellogg), 2015 .

Presenter, FIRS (Iceland), 2015.

Presenter, Junior Empirical Legal Scholars Workshop (Jerusalem), 2015.

Presenter, Swiss Society for Financial Market Research (Zurich), 2015.

Presenter, Entrepreneurial Finance and Innovation Conference (Brandeis University), 2015

Presenter, CEPR ESSFM Conference (Gerzensee), 2014.

Presenter & Discussant, UCLA Law School (Western Empirical Legal Studies Conference), 2014.

Participant, NBER Entrepreneurship Boot Camp, 2013.

Presenter, University of Illinois Urbana Champaign Brown Bag Seminars (2011, 2013).

Discussant, Financial Management Association (FMA) Annual Meetings, Denver, USA, 2011.